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We present and define a new privacy-preserving problem, called Oblivious Set-member Decision 
problem, which allows a server to decide whether a private secret of a user is a member of his 
private set in an oblivious manner. Namely, if the secret belongs to his private set, he doesn’t 
know which member it is. We propose a quantum solution to the Oblivious Set-member Decision 
problem. Compared to classical solutions, the proposed quantum protocol achieves an exponential 
reduction in communication complexity, since it only needs 𝑂𝑂(1) communication cost.  
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk 
I. INTRODUCTION
The 21st century is the era of information. However, 
information brings us not only opportunities and 
fortunes but also problems and troubles, such as the 
overflow of junk information, the loss of important 
information and the leakage of privacy information. 
Especially, among these problems, how to protect 
privacy has become the focus of widely attentions these 
days.   
Furthermore, with the rapid development of the 
technologies of quantum communication and quantum 
computation, researchers began to consider quantum 
methods to solve privacy-preserving problems, such as 
blind quantum computing [1-5], quantum homornorphic 
encryption [6], quantum private query [7-10], quantum 
bit commitment [11-14], quantum oblivious transfer 
[15-17] and so on. 
    In this paper, we consider a new but interesting 
privacy-preserving problem. Imagine that a user, Alice, 
has a private secret and a server, Bob, owns a private 
set. Bob wants to know whether Alice’s private secret is 
a member of his private set, but Alice does not want 
him to know her secret (privacy) and further which 
member of his private set it is equal to (anonymity). In 
this paper, we call it Oblivious Set-member Decision 
(OSMD) problem. Obviously, OSMD can be used to 
privately compute the cardinality of set intersection and 
union. In addition, it is also widely applied in fields of 
the identifiable and verifiable circumstances as a 
primitive protocol. For example, suppose that there is a 
server and n  users ( 1U , 2U ,…, nU ), who form a special 
distributed group (e.g., health system) via wire or 
wireless networks, and the server only provides 
resources or services for his authorized users. During 
the initialization phase, the server randomly generates a 
unique secret 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  for every legal user 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 . During the 
Authentication phase, the user requests the server to 
execute an OSMD protocol, so that the server can 
decide whether the private secret of the user lies in the 
set, 𝐾𝐾, which consists of all authorized user’s secrets 
generated by the server in advance. If 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐾𝐾 (but 𝑖𝑖 is 
unknown), then the user iU  is an authorized user and 
further the server opens the corresponding resources or 
provides services to him/her. Otherwise, the verification 
fails. Obviously, it does not reveal any identity 
information of the user while executing the OSMD 
protocol; that is, it satisfies the request of the 
anonymous property. 
Suppose that Alice has a secret, 𝑘𝑘, and Bob a private 
set, {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛} . In classical settings, in order to 
protect Alice’s anonymity, it is necessary to make a 
decision of each 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  by Alice and Bob 
collaboratively, not just by Bob independently. Since 
𝑘𝑘 ∉ {𝑘𝑘1,𝑘𝑘2,…,𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛} ⇔ (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑘𝑘1) ∧ (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑘𝑘2) ∧ …∧ (𝑘𝑘 ≠
𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛) , it needs at least 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛)  communication costs to 
solve the OSMD problem in classical settings. In this 
paper, however, we propose a quantum OSMD protocol, 
which only needs 𝑂𝑂(1) communication cost. 
II. THE PROTOCOL 
A. DEFINITION 
We first define Oblivious Set-member Decision 
problem as follows. 
Definition 1 (Oblivious Set-member Decision Problem): 
Alice has a private secret, 𝑘𝑘 , and Bob a private set, 
{𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛} . Bob wants to know whether Alice’s 
secret 𝑘𝑘  belongs to the set of {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}  in an 
oblivious manner. That is, though Bob finally know 
whether 𝑘𝑘 is a member of the set of {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}, he 
doesn’t know which member it is and further doesn’t 
know Alice’s secret 𝑘𝑘 yet. 
Definition 2 (Oblivious Set-member Decision Protocol): 
the user, Alice, inputs a private secret, 𝑘𝑘, and the server, 
Bob, inputs a private set,  {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛} . After 
executing this protocol, Alice outputs nothing but Bob 
outputs whether the secret 𝑘𝑘  belongs to the set of 
{𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}. In addition, this protocol should satisfy: 
Correctness: Bob gets 1 if 𝑘𝑘 is a member of the set of 
{𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛} and 0 otherwise. 
Alice’s Privacy: Bob can not get any other secret 
information about the secret 𝑘𝑘 except knowing whether 
it is a member of the set of {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}. 
Alice’s anonymity: If 𝑘𝑘  is a member of the set of 
{𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}, Bob should not know which member is 
equal to the secret,  𝑘𝑘 . That is, he don’t know the 
specific subscript, 𝑖𝑖, such that  𝑘𝑘 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛}).  
Bob’s Privacy: Alice can not know any secret 
information about the set of {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}. 
B. PROTOCOL 
Suppose Alice’s secrets 𝑘𝑘  and Bob’s all 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  are the 
elements of the set of ℤ𝑁𝑁∗ = {1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 − 1}. Now, let 
us describe the proposed OSMD protocol in detail as 
follows: 
1) Bob first generates an N-element database (see FIG 
1), where the jth element 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) = 1 if 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 
( 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛] ), and 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) = 0  otherwise (encoding). 
Then Bob randomly generates 𝑟𝑟1, 𝑟𝑟2,⋯𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 ∈ {0,1} 
and further computes 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) ⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  for 𝑡𝑡 = 1 
to 𝑙𝑙  and 𝑗𝑗 = 1 to 𝑁𝑁 − 1 (encrypting), where 𝑙𝑙  is a 
security parameter. Please note that Alice and Bob 
agree to let  𝑝𝑝(0) = 0  and 𝑞𝑞1(0) = 𝑞𝑞2(0) = ⋯ =
𝑞𝑞𝑙𝑙(0) = 0 in advance. 
2) Alice prepares 𝑙𝑙  log𝑁𝑁 -qubit registers, where one 
contains the encoded state |0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2
 ( 𝑘𝑘  is Alice’s 







 (all 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 s are random 
integers in ℤ𝑁𝑁∗ ). Furthermore, Alice sends all 𝑙𝑙 
registers to Bob in random order (as shown in FIG 
2), and make a record of the order of the sent 
sequences. 
3) After receiving all registers from Alice, Bob 
applies an oracle 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 on the 𝑡𝑡th register for 𝑡𝑡 = 1 to 
𝑙𝑙  and then sends them back to Alice. Where the 
oracle is and works as follows [9]: 




�,           (1) 
|𝜓𝜓1⟩ = |0⟩+|𝑗𝑗⟩√2   




.                         (3) 
4) For each decoy state returned from Bob, Alice 
performs an honest test. That is, Alice check 
whether the superposition in the returned state was 
preserved as follows: 
|0⟩𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖+|𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖⟩𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
√2




the two possible states are obviously orthogonal 
and further she knows 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖. If Alice finds a cheat of 
Bob, she will terminate this protocol. Otherwise 
continue to the next step. 
5) For the encoded state returned from Bob, Alice will 







                     = |±⟩|0⟩⨂(𝑚𝑚−1) .               (4) 
Where 𝑚𝑚 = log𝑁𝑁 and there are 𝕀𝕀 ones in the binary 
representation of 𝑘𝑘, with 𝕀𝕀𝑓𝑓 pointing to the first “1” 
and 𝕀𝕀𝑡𝑡  pointing to the 𝑡𝑡 th “1”. 𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(1,𝕀𝕀𝑓𝑓)   is a 
unitary operation which swaps between the first 
and the 𝕀𝕀𝑓𝑓th qubit. This operation ensures the first 
qubit is a one. In addition, 𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡(1,𝕀𝕀𝑡𝑡)  is a 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 
gate operation which the first qubit is the control 
qubit and the 𝕀𝕀𝑡𝑡 th qubit is a target qubit. After 
performing the above unitary operations, Alice 
measures only the first qubit in the encoded state 
on the basis of {|+⟩, |−⟩} . If she gets |+⟩ , then 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) = 0 , where 𝑠𝑠  is the order of the encoded 
state in the sent sequences. Otherwise, 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) = 1.  
6) Alice sends 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘)  and 𝑠𝑠  to Bob by the 
authenticated classical channel. 
7) After receiving the classical information, 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) and 
𝑠𝑠, Bob computes 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) ⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠. If 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) = 1, 
then he can decide that Alice’s secret belongs to his 
private set (i.e. 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛} ). Otherwise, 
𝑘𝑘 ∉ {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}. 
C. ANALYSIS 




  are obviously 
orthogonal, it is perfectly possible to distinguish 
between them by doing a Von Neumann measurement 
[7-9]. Furthermore, Alice can rightly get 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘)  by 
distinguishing the encoded state returned from Bob, and 
further Bob can privately obtain 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) . That is, this 
protocol clearly and rightly works when Alice and Bob 
honestly execute the protocol. 
On the one hand, Bob’s privacy rests on his 
encrypting method, which is one-time pad. If Alice 
honestly executing this protocol, obviously she can only 
get 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘), instead of 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘). Since  𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) ⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 
and 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠  is unknown and random, so Alice can’t know 
𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘). Even if Alice is dishonest, she can get at most 𝑙𝑙 
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)s. However, by these 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)s, she can’t still obtain 
any 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)  rightly, because Bob uses one-time pad to 
encrypt 𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) (that is, all 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡s are random and unknown). 
Therefore, Alice can’t get any secret information about 
the private set of {𝑘𝑘1, 𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}  in the proposed 
protocol. 
On the other hand, Alice’s privacy depends on Bob’s 
impossibility of distinguishing the encoded quantum 
state sent from Alice. Two basic elements of quantum 
theory enforce this: No-cloning Theorem which forbids 
the creation of identical copies of an arbitrary unknown 
quantum state, and Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle 
which implies that it is impossible to measure the state 
of any system without disturbing that system.  
To illustrate it concretely, we consider that Bob is 
dishonest. For a dishonest Bob, it is possible to perform 
an intercept and resend attack. That is, when he 
receives the state of |0⟩+|𝑗𝑗⟩
√2
, he first measures it and then 
prepares and resends a new state by his measured 
results. Since he doesn’t know 𝑗𝑗 , he can’t rightly 
perform a Von Neumann measurement to distinguish 
the received state. If he only applies a simple projective 
measurement, he might eventually succeed to pass the 
honest test, but not with the probability of more than 12. 
In our protocol, however, Alice’s secret state is sent in 
random order, that is, it is hided in other 𝑙𝑙 − 1 decoy 
states. So, if Bob wants to get Alice’s secret by this 
attack, the success probability is not more than 2−𝑙𝑙 .  
Furthermore, we discuss a more complicated 
entangle-measure attack by a dishonest Bob that he is 
able to prepare an ancillary system and entangle the 
ancillary system with the states transmitted from Alice 
to him by his local unitary operations, and afterwards 
he can measure the ancillary system to get the partial 
information about Alice’s secret. For simplicity, we 
only consider the encoded state of |0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2
. Suppose that 
the initial state of the ancillary system is |0⟩𝐵𝐵 and Bob’s 
dishonest action when he receives Alice’s register can 
be described by a unitary operator 𝑈𝑈�𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 , which acts on 
the register 𝑄𝑄  and the ancillary system 𝐵𝐵 . We can 
describe it as follows: 
𝑈𝑈�𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵�0⟩𝑄𝑄�0⟩𝐵𝐵 = �𝜂𝜂0�0⟩𝑄𝑄�𝜙𝜙0⟩𝐵𝐵 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂0|𝑉𝑉0⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵,   (5) 
𝑈𝑈�𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵�𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄�0⟩𝐵𝐵 = �𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘�𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄�𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵,  (6) 
    𝑈𝑈�𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 �|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩√2 �𝑄𝑄
|0⟩𝐵𝐵 = �𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘�|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩√2 �𝑄𝑄|𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 
+�1 − 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵,     (7) 
where |𝑉𝑉0⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 , |𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵  and |𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵  are a vector 
orthogonal to �0⟩𝑄𝑄�𝜙𝜙0⟩𝐵𝐵 , �𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄�𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵  and | + 𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄|𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 
(|+𝑘𝑘⟩ = |0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩
√2
), respectively, i.e., 
𝑄𝑄⟨0|𝐵𝐵⟨𝜙𝜙0|𝑉𝑉0⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = 0,                           (8) 
𝑄𝑄⟨𝑘𝑘|𝐵𝐵⟨𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = 0,                           (9) 
𝑄𝑄⟨+𝑘𝑘|𝐵𝐵⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = 0.                  (10) 
From Eqs. (5) and (6), we can easily deduce that the 














(�𝜂𝜂0�0⟩𝑄𝑄�𝜙𝜙0⟩𝐵𝐵 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂0|𝑉𝑉0⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵  
                   +�𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘�𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄�𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵).      (11) 
If we compute the scalar product between Eqs. (7) and 
(11), we will obtain the identity 























⟨𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 |𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 .                        (12) 





















 .                     (13)            
Suppose that the probability of Bob’s passing the 
honest test is higher than a certain threshold, i.e.,  
𝜂𝜂0 > 1 − 𝜀𝜀, 
𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘 > 1 − 𝜀𝜀, 
𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘 > 1 − 𝜀𝜀.                             (14) 







2√2√𝜀𝜀 + √2𝜀𝜀.                                          (15) 
It implies the following conditions hold, 
⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 |𝜙𝜙0⟩𝐵𝐵 > 1 − 2(√2 +
√𝜀𝜀
√2
)√𝜀𝜀,          (16) 
⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 > 1 − 2(√2 +
√𝜀𝜀
√2
)√𝜀𝜀.          (17) 
From Eqs. (16) and (17), it shows that if 𝜀𝜀 → 0, then 
⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 |𝜙𝜙0⟩𝐵𝐵 → 1 and ⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 |𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 → 1. That is, if Bob 
wants to be sure that he fully passes the honest test, 
then the final states of the ancillary system 𝐵𝐵 for any 
choice of 𝑘𝑘 will coincide with |𝜙𝜙0⟩𝐵𝐵, that is, the states 
of the ancillary system 𝐵𝐵 are independent of the secret 
 𝑘𝑘.  
Furthermore, we give an upper bound to Bob’s 
information on the secret 𝑘𝑘 by considering the mutual 
information 𝐼𝐼  that connects the classical variable 
𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 − 1} , which labels Alice’s secret, and 
Bob’s estimation of this variable. The ancillary system 
𝐵𝐵  can be characterized by the quantum ensemble 
ℇ ≡ {𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 =
1
𝑁𝑁
,𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵(𝑘𝑘)} [8], where 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 =
1
𝑁𝑁
 is Alice’s 
probability of owning the secret 𝑘𝑘  (Assuming that 
initially Bob does not have any prior information on the 
value of 𝑘𝑘), and 
𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵(𝑘𝑘) = 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄(|Ψ⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵〈Ψ|) 
                     = 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘)𝜎𝜎�𝑘𝑘,       (18) 
with  






= �𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘�|0⟩+|𝑘𝑘⟩√2 �𝑄𝑄|𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵 + �1 − 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉+𝑘𝑘⟩𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵, 
𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 = |𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘⟩𝐵𝐵⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘|.                      (19) 
From the Holevo bound [18], we obtain 
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝒳𝒳(ℇ) = 𝑆𝑆(𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵) −
1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝑆(𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵(𝑘𝑘))𝑁𝑁−1𝑘𝑘=0 ,           (20) 
where 𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵 = ∑ 𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵(𝑘𝑘)/𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−1𝑘𝑘=0  is the average state of 𝐵𝐵 . 
This allows us to write also 
𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵 = 𝜂𝜂𝜎𝜎 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝜎𝜎�,                       (21) 
with 
 𝜎𝜎 ≡ ∑ 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁𝜂𝜂
𝑁𝑁−1




𝑘𝑘=0 𝜎𝜎�𝑘𝑘,         (22) 
where 𝜂𝜂 = ∑ 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘/𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘  is Bob’s average probability of 
passing the honest test, which must be greater than 
1 − 𝜀𝜀. Equations (18) and (21) can then be exploited to 
produce the following inequalities [8] 
𝑆𝑆(𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵) ≤ 𝐻𝐻2(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜂𝜂𝑆𝑆(𝜎𝜎) + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑆𝑆(𝜎𝜎�),        (23) 
𝑆𝑆(𝜌𝜌𝐵𝐵(𝑘𝑘)) ≥ 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆(𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘) + (1 − 𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘)𝑆𝑆(𝜎𝜎�𝑘𝑘),       (24) 
where 𝐻𝐻2(𝑥𝑥) ≡ −𝑥𝑥log𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝑥𝑥)log (1 − 𝑥𝑥)  is the 
binary entropy. Therefore Eq. (20) gives 




(1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝒳𝒳 �� 1−𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁(1−𝜂𝜂)
;𝜎𝜎�𝑘𝑘��,            (25) 
where 𝒳𝒳 �� 1−𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁(1−𝜂𝜂)
;𝜎𝜎�𝑘𝑘��  is the Holevo information 
associated with a source characterized by probabilities 
1−𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁(1−𝜂𝜂)
. This quantity can never be bigger than log2𝑁𝑁 
(the same applies to  𝒳𝒳 ��𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁𝜂𝜂
;𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘�� , but we are not 
going to use it). Therefore, we can write 
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐻𝐻2(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜂𝜂𝒳𝒳 ��
𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁𝜂𝜂
;𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘�� + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)log2𝑁𝑁.    (26) 
By Eq. (16), the density matrices 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘  can be 
decomposed as the following expression 
𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 = 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘|𝜙𝜙0⟩⟨𝜙𝜙0| + (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘)𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 + ∆𝑘𝑘,        (27) 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘  are density matrices formed by vectors |𝑣𝑣⊥⟩ 
orthogonal to |𝜙𝜙0⟩ , ∆𝑘𝑘  are traceless operators 
containing off-diagonal terms of the form |𝜙𝜙0⟩⟨𝑣𝑣⊥|, and 
the probabilities satisfy the following conditions 
                         𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘 = ⟨𝜙𝜙0|𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘|𝜙𝜙0⟩ 
                              = ⟨𝜙𝜙0|𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘⟩⟨𝜙𝜙+𝑘𝑘|𝜙𝜙0⟩ 
> 1 − 8√𝜀𝜀.                                  (28) 
  Accordingly, we can write also 
𝜎𝜎 = 𝑞𝑞|𝜙𝜙0⟩⟨𝜙𝜙0| + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜏𝜏 + ∆,              (29) 




𝑘𝑘=0 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘 > 1 − 8√𝜀𝜀.       (30) 
Therefore, we can get 
                  𝒳𝒳 ��𝜂𝜂+𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁𝜂𝜂
;𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘�� ≤ 𝑆𝑆(𝜎𝜎) 
                            ≤ 𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞|𝜙𝜙0⟩⟨𝜙𝜙0| + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜏𝜏) 
                            ≤ 𝐻𝐻2(𝑞𝑞) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑆𝑆(𝜏𝜏) 
≤ 𝐻𝐻2(𝑞𝑞) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)log2𝑁𝑁.             (31) 
Replacing this into Eq. (26), we finally obtain 
𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝐻𝐻2(𝜂𝜂) + 𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻2(𝑞𝑞) + (1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑞𝑞)log2𝑁𝑁.      (32) 
It implies (by Eq. (30)) 
     𝐼𝐼 ≤ 𝑐𝑐√𝜀𝜀log2𝑁𝑁.                           (33) 
This means that Alice can limit Bob’s information I, by 
employing in her tests a value of 𝜀𝜀 sufficiently small. In 
turn, if Bob wants to pass the honest test with high 
probability, he must retain low information on Alice’s 
secret.  
In addition, Alice’s anonymity is based on her 
privacy, which ensures that Bob honestly executes the 
protocol. On the one hand, obviously Bob can’t directly 
measure the received quantum states to get Alice’s 
secret information. Otherwise he will not completely 
pass the honest test. On the other hand, he can’t yet 
obtain any correlation between Alice’s secret and his 
certain member, only by the received classical 
information ( 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘)  and 𝑠𝑠 ). Therefore, the proposed 
protocol guarantees Alice’s anonymity. 
Finally, we evaluate communication costs of the 
proposed protocol. As shown in FIG 2 and FIG 3, we 
can easily see that the numbers of the exchanged 
quantum and classical messages are 2𝑙𝑙  and 2, 
respectively, which are all independent of the number 
of the elements of the set, 𝑛𝑛 , so the communication 
complexity is constant, 𝑂𝑂(1).  
III. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented and defined the Oblivious 
Set-member Decision problem and then proposed a 
quantum protocol to solve this problem. In the proposed 
protocol, the server first creates a private database by 
the private set and then introduces an oracle to perform 
the phase transformation on the encoded state, so that 
he can finally know whether the user’s secret belongs to 
his private set in an oblivious manner. In turn, the user 
utilizes the decoy technology to prevent the dishonesty 
of the server. Especially, the communication 
complexity of the proposed protocol is reduced to the 
constant, 𝑂𝑂(1) , instead of 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛) . Therefore, the 
proposed protocol is especially suitable for oblivious 
set-member decision of the large-size set or dataset. 
Like most classical/quantum secure multi-party 
protocols, it can use classical/quantum bit commitment, 
zero-knowledge proof and other verifiable technologies 
to ensure that the parties honestly execute the protocol. 
This is our future work. 
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FIG 3. The exchanged classical information between Alice and Bob. 































{𝑘𝑘1,𝑘𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}  
Bob 
(Server) 




     𝟎𝟎               𝟎𝟎         ⋯         𝟎𝟎               𝟎𝟎             𝟎𝟎    
 0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟1      0⊕ 𝑟𝑟2    ⋯    0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙         0             1      
 0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟1      0⊕ 𝑟𝑟2    ⋯    0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙         0             2      
      ⋮                 ⋮                       ⋮                ⋮              ⋮ 
𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏      𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐    ⋯   𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝒍𝒍        𝟏𝟏             𝒌𝒌𝟏𝟏       
0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟1       0⊕ 𝑟𝑟2     ⋯    0⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙        0         𝑘𝑘1 + 1  
     ⋮                  ⋮                        ⋮               ⋮               ⋮  
𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏      𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐    ⋯    𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝒍𝒍        𝟏𝟏             𝒌𝒌𝟐𝟐     
0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟1       0⊕ 𝑟𝑟2     ⋯    0⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙         0         𝑘𝑘2 + 1   
     ⋮                   ⋮                       ⋮                ⋮               ⋮      
𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝟏𝟏      𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝟐𝟐    ⋯    𝟏𝟏⊕ 𝒓𝒓𝒍𝒍        𝟏𝟏              𝒌𝒌𝒏𝒏   
0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟1       0⊕ 𝑟𝑟2     ⋯     0⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙         0         𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛 + 1 
     ⋮                  ⋮                         ⋮                ⋮               ⋮     
0 ⊕ 𝑟𝑟1       0⊕ 𝑟𝑟2     ⋯     0⊕ 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙         0           𝑁𝑁 − 1   






{𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) , 𝑠𝑠} 
 
𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑘𝑘) ⊕𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 
